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 Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the 
Supreme Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law: 
Some Implications for the ALI Proposals  
on De Facto Parenthood∗ 
David M. Wagner∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) proposed 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution1 proposes to widen con-
siderably two relatively new concepts in family law: “de facto parent-
hood”2 and “parenthood by estoppel.”3 Of course, persons other 
than biological or adoptive parents have been acting in parental roles 
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law; B.A., Yale, 1980; M.A., Yale, 
1984; J.D., George Mason University School of Law, 1992. 
 1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) § 2.03 [hereinafter PRINCIPLES 
(Tentative Draft No. 4)]. 
 2. A concept by the name of “de facto parenthood” is given limited recognition in 
California’s Family Law Act of 1969. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600; see also CAL. R. COURT 
1401, 1410, 1412. “The term de facto parenthood has its genesis in the juvenile justice system 
and generally has been used to refer to foster parents caring for dependent children.” Z.C.W. 
v. Lisa W., 71 Cal. App. 4th 524, 528 (1999). A Florida court rejected a same-sex partner’s 
claim to de facto parenthood in Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 3. In 1991, Wisconsin rejected both “de facto parenthood” and the notion of an “‘eq-
uitable’ parent”; In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Wis. 1991). But Z.J.H. was 
overruled on this point in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted visitation to a biological mother’s former same-
sex partner, over the biological mother’s objections, invoking both “de facto parenthood” and 
the “equitable parent doctrine,” E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). The court 
specifically cited the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (Tentative Draft No. 
3, Part I, March 20, 1998) § 2.03. E.N.O., 711 N.E. 2d at 891. In Pennsylvania, a court as 
early as 1979 used the term “parent by estoppel” where a putative father—later conclusively 
proved not to be the biological father of the child—had failed to file exceptions to a final order 
of support for a child born to his wife ten years after he and his wife had separated. Common-
wealth ex rel Nixon v. Nixon, 458 A.2d 976, 978 (Pa. 1983). The court, however, allowed the 
filing of the exception nunc pro tunc. Id. at 982. 
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toward children for ages; what is new here as in other parts of the 
ALI Principles4 is the taking of historically nonlegal relationships into 
the domain of law. 
This proposal would recognize and regularize the notion that 
adults unrelated to a child may establish the legal equivalent of par-
enthood over that child provided (1) that they have acted in a paren-
tal role toward that child and (2) that such conduct was authorized 
by one of the natural parents. The ALI proposal forces us to think 
about the nature and origins of parental status. Does parental status 
begin and end with the biological link, or, on the contrary, is it the 
case that “parents are as parents do”? 
From my perspective as a constitutionalist rather than a family 
law expert, I would like to examine how the cases in the field of con-
stitutionalized family law balance the sometimes competing claims of 
nature and nurture in settling contested claims of parental rights, and 
what conclusions can be drawn from that examination in regard to 
the ALI proposed expansion of the concept of de facto parenthood. 
Section II of this essay will walk us through the case law on pa-
rental rights that developed in the context of the fathers’ rights cases 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Section III attempts to synthesize this case 
law so as to show its relevance to the question of de facto parent-
hood. Section IV applies this synthesis to the de facto parenthood 
concept, and Section V offers some concluding reflections, namely, 
(1) that expansive notions of de facto parenthood are not required 
by constitutional case law, which continues to respect both biological 
parenthood and customary usage, and (2) that such notions risk 
bringing about what I call parent inflation, devaluing an already too-
scarce resource. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTEXT 
OF FATHERS’ RIGHTS 
When the Supreme Court first held that Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process entitled an unwed biological father to a hearing on his 
parental fitness before custody of his children could be assigned 
elsewhere following the death of the children’s mother,5 Chief Jus-
tice Burger predicted in dissent that the case would signal “a novel 
 
 4. For example, the ALI cloaks cohabitation with legal consequences. PRINCIPLES 
(Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, §§ 6.01–6.05. 
 5. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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concept of the natural law” and that this project would “have strange 
boundaries as yet undiscernible.”6 Stanley did indeed turn out to be 
the start of a strange Rhine Journey, but a quarter of a century later, 
especially in light of the Court’s 1989 holding in Michael H. v. Ge-
rald D.,7 the river carrying us along has not yet overflowed its banks. 
The Court has affirmed the importance of the biological aspect of 
parenthood, sometimes, as in Stanley, giving it considerable impor-
tance. Thus, we can conclude that “parents are,” that is, parenthood 
is to some extent an identity arising out of biological facts. 
But at the same time, the Court has consistently affirmed that 
parenthood is a social role, such that those who play the role have 
enhanced status before the law if and when their parenthood is 
drawn into question. Thus, even in Stanley, the majority of the 
Court pointed to Mr. Stanley’s frequent (though not uninterrupted) 
efforts to act as father to his children,8 while the dissenters disputed 
the evidence for this.9 Both agreed, however, that the issue was rele-
vant to Mr. Stanley’s claim.10 Thus, we can conclude that “parents 
do,” that is, parenthood is to some extent a role defined by legal, so-
cial, and traditional expectations, and those who play the role get the 
status—or may get it. The qualifications of this “may” are among the 
issues raised by the ALI drafts. 
In Quilloin v. Walcott,11 the Court found no Due Process viola-
tion where the natural father, complaining of lack of opportunity to 
veto his child’s adoption, had done nothing to exercise or claim pa-
rental rights. Biology was not enough. Why not? Set against Mr. 
Quilloin’s biologically-based claims were the claims of a legal family, 
 
 6. Id. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 7. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (in which the Court considered the constitutionality of the 
irrebuttable “marital presumption”—the presumption that a child born to a married woman 
and conceived during a time when her husband was neither impotent nor out of the country is 
conclusively presumed to be a “child of the marriage”—as applied against an adulterous natural 
father who wished to attain parental rights over his natural daughter over the objections of the 
girl’s natural mother and legal father. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that this presump-
tion is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting the legitimacy of children 
and insulating intact families from blast-from-the-past attacks. Invoking a jurisprudence of tra-
dition, it also held that the adulterous natural father could not show that his interest was one 
that American legal traditions have historically fostered and protected; rather the opposite, in 
fact). 
 8. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650–51, 655. 
 9. See id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 10. See id. at 649; id. at 662–63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 11. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
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into which the child’s mother, Ardell Williams, proposed to enter 
with her marriage to Randall Walcott, and into which she wished to 
bring her child.12 As the Court noted at the outset, “the countervail-
ing interests are more substantial”13 than in Stanley. Winding up the 
analysis for the unanimous Court, Justice Marshall remarked: “[T]he 
result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a fam-
ily unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except 
appellant.”14 
Furthermore, Quilloin “did not petition for legitimation of his 
child at any time during the [eleven] years between the child’s birth 
and the filing of Randall Walcott’s adoption petition,”15 and he 
“[did] not complain of his exemption from [paternal] responsibilities 
and, indeed, he does not even now seek custody of his child.”16 
Thus, two rationales were offered by the Quilloin Court for its 
outcome: first, an emerging estoppel doctrine17 based on the “par-
ents do” approach to parental rights and second, respect for marriage 
as a legal institution capable of overriding the competing interests of 
an individual. Justice Marshall’s bon mot about everyone except ap-
pellant being pleased with the adoption should not be taken to mean 
that the Court resolves these disputes by polling the leading partici-
pants. Rather, the Court is indicating that the challenged law did 
what society expects family law to do: provide a legal framework for 
stable and predictable family relationships and thereby serve the best 
interests of the child.18 The two rationales of Quilloin—that the law 
rightly prefers formal family units, and that Mr. Quilloin had failed 
to act as we expect parents to act—are complementary: both speak 
essentially of socio-legal roles and expectations. The Quilloin deci-
sion suggests rather strongly that in questions of custody, we are 
dealing with social roles as much as—and perhaps more than—
individual rights or claims. 
 
 12. See id. at 247. 
 13. Id. at 248. 
 14. Id. at 255. 
 15. Id. at 249. 
 16. Id. at 256. 
 17. The estoppel doctrine dictates that if a parent does not have a social relationship 
with the child, then that parent is estopped from interfering with the adoption of the child by 
the new husband of the mother. This doctrine is based on the belief that respect for the mar-
riage institution outweighs the other interests at stake. 
 18. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 789 (2d ed. 1988). 
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Were both of these rationales necessary? Would Mr. Quilloin 
have won, despite his inactivity as a parent, if Mr. Walcott and Ms. 
Williams wished to adopt the child without marrying? Or taking the 
reverse, would Mr. Quilloin have won if he had taken a substantial 
part in the child’s upbringing, notwithstanding the Walcotts’ mar-
riage? 
This latter fact pattern came to the Court one year later in Caban 
v. Mohammed,19 the only case in this series in which a plaintiff suc-
cessfully interrupts an adoption. Here, in a 5-4 decision, the Court 
held that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by a rule that al-
lowed unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to veto an adoption 
without showing that it would be contrary to the best interests of the 
child (an issue that was not properly presented in Quilloin20). A sim-
ple application of the Equal Protection section of the Stanley opin-
ion21 might have solved the Caban case. But the Court also stressed, 
in two footnotes, another distinction from Quilloin: Leon Quilloin, 
unlike Abdiel Caban, had “fail[ed] to act as a father toward his chil-
dren,”22 and “the relationship that in fact exists between parent and 
child” is important “in cases of this kind.”23 
This welcome affirmation of the importance of actually-existing 
relationships came at some cost in that it devalued what Justice 
Stewart in dissent called the father’s “legal tie”24 with the mother. 
Justice Stewart sees this primarily in terms of denying a child the 
“benefit of legitimacy,” a benefit that the majority opinion allows 
unwed fathers to withhold from their children, at least where an ef-
fective father-child relationship exists.25 One might add that the 
benefits lost by children under the Caban holding are not only le-
 
 19. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 20. The principal equal protection issue in Quilloin concerned the disparate treatment 
of married and unmarried fathers. The Court said simply: “We think appellant’s interests are 
readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly believe 
that the State could permissibly give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married 
father.” Id. at 256. The issue of whether equal protection demands equal treatment of unwed 
fathers and unwed mothers, later squarely presented in Caban, was only alluded to in the last 
paragraph of appellant’s brief in Quilloin. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253 n.13. 
 21. “[D]enying such a hearing [on parental fitness] to Stanley and those like him [i.e. 
unmarried fathers] while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the 
Equal Protection Clause.” 405 U.S. at 658. 
 22. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7. 
 23. Id. at 393 n.14. 
 24. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. 
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gitimacy (a decreasingly significant benefit in modern society any-
way), but also the stability and predictability that children need and 
that are furthered by legal formality.26 
As Justice Stewart also notes, the majority in Caban requires 
adoption to pass a double obstacle course: ratification by both par-
ents, not just one, at least where both parents have had a parental re-
lationship with the child.27 For Justice Stewart, this holding is a re-
grettable deterrent to adoptions, but, for the time being, such are 
the demands of Equal Protection. Significantly, portions of Justice 
Stewart’s dissent were adopted as part of the opinion of the Court in 
Lehr v. Robertson.28 Lehr may be said to form a bridge between Ca-
ban and Michael H. Jonathan Lehr, having begotten Jessica M. out 
of wedlock, sought to block the adoption of Jessica by her mother, 
Lorraine, and Lorraine’s new husband, Richard Robertson. Mr. Lehr 
had not, however, formed a paternal relationship with Jessica. Thus, 
Lehr may be said to be Caban without the actually-existing relation-
ship between the plaintiff-father and the child. Lehr is also Michael 
H. without the actually-existing marriage at the time the child was 
conceived and born. The result is in contrast with Caban and in line 
with Michael H.—that is, the unwed father loses—suggesting that 
Quilloin, Lehr, and Michael H. are the lead cases, and Caban the 
outlier. 
III. DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
What does this tell us about the issue of “parents are” versus 
“parents do,” or nature versus nurture? First, within that dichotomy, 
the Court placed more stress on “parents do,” or nurture. Thus, Ab-
diel Caban won because he had acted as a social and effective father, 
 
 26. These benefits are also discussed by Justice Stevens in a separate dissent: 
[A] rule that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive right to consent 
to its adoption . . . gives the mother, in whose sole charge the infant is often placed 
anyway, the maximum flexibility in deciding how best to care for the child. It also 
gives the loving father an incentive to marry the mother, and has no adverse impact 
on the disinterested father. Finally, it facilitates the interests of the adoptive parents, 
the child, and the public at large by streamlining the often traumatic adoption proc-
ess and allowing the prompt, complete, and reliable integration of the child into a 
satisfactory new home at as young an age as is feasible. 
Id. at 407–08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Obviously, Justice Stevens’s view will be less compelling 
the less one views the father marrying the mother as a prima facie benefit to the child. 
 27. Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 28. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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not just as a biological father, to his child, while Leon Quilloin and 
Jonathan Lehr lost because they did not. Paul Stanley won partly be-
cause he was the biological father, but also because he had a paternal 
relationship with the children. The social rather than the biological 
aspect of parenting seems to be the determining factor. Thus, all 
lights seem to be green for the ALI project of expanding de facto 
parenthood. 
But we have not yet accounted for Michael H. In this case—
made famous by its footnote six29 and by its coruscating by-play be-
tween Justices Scalia and Brennan30—a plaintiff-father situated very 
similarly to Abdiel Caban nonetheless loses. Why? Because in Mi-
chael H., unlike Caban, “an extant marital unit that wishe[d] to em-
brace the child”31 existed at the time she was conceived; this fact 
triggered the marital presumption rule,32 which was the actual focus 
of the litigation. At the end of the day, the Court held that a mar-
riage that is both formal (a marriage recognized as such by law) and 
effective (its participants desire to maintain it and to keep within it 
“the child they acknowledge to be theirs”33) prevails even over an 
unwed father who has had a paternal relationship with the child. 
Why is this outcome significant? In Lehr, the Court adopted por-
 
 29. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6. This footnote, written by Justice 
Scalia and joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggests a methodology for reconciling the 
substantive due process cases that trace their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), with the demands of judicial 
restraint. In a nutshell, this methodology consists of articulating new constitutional rights-
claims at “the most specific level [of generality] at which a relevant tradition protecting, or de-
nying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Micheal H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6. 
Any other method, Justice Scalia argues, including that of leaving it up to the Court to decide 
the appropriate “level of generality” at which to articulate a rights-claim, would “permit judges 
to dictate rather than discern the society’s views.” Id. 
 30. 491 U.S. at 123 n.2, 124 n.4, 126 n.5, 127 n.6, 129 n.7 & 130; see also id. at 137, 
156 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 31. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127. 
 32. The “marital presumption” is the common-law rule that a child born to a married 
woman, assuming her husband was neither impotent nor out of the country at the time of 
conception, is conclusively (or, in some jurisdictions, rebuttably) presumed to be legitimate. 
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117. The purpose of this “fundamental principle of common 
law,” id. at 124, is to protect children’s legitimacy by relieving them of the need to prove it 
except in unusual cases. See id. at 125 (common law had “an aversion to declaring children 
illegitimate”). As Justice Scalia explains in Michael H., citing a five hundred year span of com-
mon law authorities, id. at 124–25, the rule also preserves family stability by “excluding inquir-
ies into the child’s paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy.” Id. at 
120. 
 33. Id. at 124. 
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tions of Justice Stewart’s Caban dissent to the effect that a “legal tie” 
between the parents may limit “whatever substantive constitutional 
claims might otherwise exist”34 on the part of outsiders to that legal 
tie, even if that outsider is a biological father enjoying an “actual re-
lationship with the children.”35 Justice Stewart’s “legal tie” dictum 
was further adopted by the plurality in Michael H.36 in support of a 
theme that runs throughout that opinion: the tradition of our family 
law favors the creation and maintenance of a formal, legal entity (one 
may call it the “unitary family”); the family law tradition further fa-
vors the immunizing of this entity against legal attack (hence the le-
gitimacy presumption at issue in Michael H.) and makes this entity, 
in an important sense, exclusive. Access to the entity for an outsider 
is decidedly the exception and not the rule. 
 Thus, the combined teaching of Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. 
seems to be that the unwed biological father has constitutionally-
protected parental rights if, but only if, he has established a paternal 
relationship with the child and no marital unit exists with which such 
rights would conflict. Thus, to the dichotomy of “parents are” and 
“parents do” or nature and nurture, Lehr and Michael H. add a 
third term, which may be called “formality” or “legality.” 
Legality and tradition are not unrelated phenomena. But here, 
clashing jurisprudential philosophies beckon.37 I will make a merely 
Burkean claim,38 perhaps filtered through Alasdair MacIntyre:39 laws 
 
 34. Lehr, 463 U.S. 262 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 491 U.S. at 128–29. 
 37. For instance, one may be an Austinian positivist, see generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE 
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (photo. reprint 1984) (1832), in which case one 
would most likely believe that the backing of tradition may make the masses feel better about a 
law but will not even remotely affect the law’s validity. Or one may be a natural law theorist—
and then debate whether natural law privileges marriage as traditionally understood, as argued 
in John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophi-
cal and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997) and in Robert P. George & 
Gerard Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995), or whether it 
privileges moral innovation and/or self-fulfillment, as argued in KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S 
PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION (1993) and in David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy 
and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986). 
 38. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
(photo. reprint 1993) (1790). 
 39. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 
(1984); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); David 
Wagner, Alasdair MacIntyre: Recovering the Rationality of Traditions, in LIBERALISM AT THE 
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that lack roots in the established practices of a community can be ef-
fective, if at all, only through force. On the contrary, laws that reflect 
and protect the customs of a community are conducive to civic 
peace. To be sure, such laws run the risk of ossifying ancient errors 
under color of “tradition.” But this harm—and it is one—is balanced 
by the fact that civic peace conduces to trust among citizens, which 
is a pre-condition for consensual change in the law. (Trust among 
citizens can, of course, be dispensed with where legal change is to be 
brought about by violent revolution or by judicial activism.) 
IV. APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO  
DE FACTO PARENTING 
What does this have to do with whether state laws should 
broaden the category of de facto parenthood in post-divorce custody 
conflicts? After all, ex hypothesi, no extant marital unit40 exists to 
provide a Michael H.-type “extant family” with which the claims of a 
de facto parent could conflict. Furthermore, if legality and legal rec-
ognition are our concern, then surely legal recognition of such rights 
is the solution, not the problem. 
There are two problems with this point of view. One is that the 
ALI drafts contemplate the recognition of de facto parenthood on 
the part of persons who have engaged in parent-like activities toward 
the child, provided those activities took place with the consent of 
one—not both!—of the natural parents.41 There is at least some ten-
sion between this rule and the holding in Caban: that when both 
parents have established a parental relationship with the child, both 
parents must sign off on an adoption, i.e., on any legal recognition 
of parental rights in persons who have not hitherto possessed them 
in regard to the child in question. 
Caban to one side, I can see arguments both for and against the 
one-parent rule for creating the precursor facts for de facto parent-
 
CROSSROADS 97 (C. Wolfe & J. Hittinger eds. 1994). 
 40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 41. A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel 
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for 
reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent 
to form a parent-child relationship. . . . (A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking 
functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as 
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.03  (second emphasis added). 
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hood. In favor of it is the argument made by Justice Stewart in his 
Caban dissent regarding adoption,42 applied by analogy to de facto 
parenthood: to give both parents a veto power over adoption will 
impede the adoption process, promote tactical obstruction by a par-
ent holding out for something else, and so forth. If de facto parent-
hood is beneficial to children, then requiring bi-parental consent for 
its creation—or, more accurately, for the precursor facts for its crea-
tion—is undesirable. 
But this only brings me to my second problem with de facto par-
enthood legislation. De facto parenthood is not necessarily as benefi-
cial to children as adoption. It does not, for instance, guarantee the 
child a home—only a relationship. This may make de facto parent-
hood congenial to an era that values relationships but tends to deni-
grate the concept of the home: after all, relationships are fluid and 
expressive, whereas homes tend to be solid, silent, and stationary.43 It 
is true, of course, that children whose natural parents have divorced 
benefit greatly from parent-like relationships with other adults; the 
inevitable pain of parental divorce is greatly lessened for many chil-
dren by teachers, coaches, and other mentors who take up some of 
the slack left by divorcing parents. But these heroes do not need le-
gal status to do what they are doing. 
What then does de facto parenthood contribute? It is not the 
equivalent of adoption; it is not necessary for a mentoring relation-
ship; it does, however, sow uncertainty and fluidity about the mean-
ing of parenthood. 
Consequently, the specter of “parent inflation” must be consid-
ered. We know what happens when governments print money with-
out restraint: the result is not more wealth, but less, as each unit of 
money declines in value. Parent-child relationships, of course, are not 
currency, but they have at least this much in common with it: they 
are valuable at least in part because of their protected legal status. 
When the government prints “This note is legal tender for all debts, 
 
 42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 43. There is now an extensive literature seeking to rehabilitate the concepts of home and 
family from attacks rooted in expressive individualism. See, e.g., BARBARA DAFOE 
WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1996) (esp. ch. 3); MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE 
ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE (1996); MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS (1989); MAGGIE 
GALLAGHER & LINDA WAITE, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE (2000); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE 
CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1979); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: 
THE FAMILY BESIEGED (photo. reprint 1995) (1977); DANA MACK, THE ASSAULT ON 
PARENTHOOD: HOW OUR CULTURE UNDERMINES THE FAMILY (1997). 
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public and private” on a bill, it is giving that bill a special status vis-à-
vis other pieces of paper. It can extend that status to more and more 
pieces of paper, but the only effect of such “de facto currency” will 
be to make all currency less valuable. 
Not that such experiments would be unconstitutional. As the 
plurality in Michael H. stressed, it was the state legislature in that 
case, not the Court, that made the value judgment that the Court 
upheld. There may be a Meyer-Pierce-based argument to be made 
against de facto parenthood,44 but it would take considerable judicial 
activism for the Court to buy such an argument. If judicial activism is 
to be avoided, as I think it should be, the Court’s family law cases 
from Meyer to Michael H. cannot be read to create a constitutional 
obstacle to de facto parenthood. 
But if they do not prohibit it, neither do they encourage it. The 
doctrine of these cases, and of Michael H. in particular, is that the 
dichotomy of “parents are” and “parents do,” of biology and social-
ity, or nature and nurture, is inadequate. Biology and sociality, or na-
ture and nurture, are both important in the creation and mainte-
nance of families, but a further step must be taken, namely, the 
“legal tie” of which Justice Stewart spoke45 and the formality implied 
in his concept of the “formal family.” 
It is not enough to say that states will change their laws in light 
of the ALI recommendations, thus providing the needed formality. 
My argument is that of the three—nature, nurture, and formality—
none of the three is dispensable. The ALI would ground the new 
formality of de facto parenthood in the nurture provided by the de 
facto parent, but the link to the natural or biological family is slen-
der; the ALI proposal requires the consent of only one natural par-
ent, and the consent is not to the de facto parental relationship itself. 
Rather, the consent is only to the precursor facts that the would-be 
 
 
 44. The argument might go: Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny stand for the preferred 
position of the family and of parent-child relationships in our constitutional order, as those 
concepts were understood at the time these decisions were rendered, or else at the time the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which these decisions construe, was drafted. An attempt by govern-
ment to undermine this institution by “parental inflation” may well violate the long-
recognized rights of parents, much as government action that destroys the value of an individ-
ual’s material holdings may be unconstitutional as a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. 
But, as noted in the text, this argument would require of the Court a legislative role that it has 
often repudiated, not least in Michael H. itself. 
 45. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
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de facto parent may later use in their petition for that status from a 
court.46 
V. CONCLUSION 
I respectfully suggest that the impulse toward de facto parent-
hood is driven at least in part by the perception that what children 
need are relationships with adults, rather than the social and legal in-
stitutions that have an historical track record in fostering relation-
ships. The thinking seems to be this: take the best mentoring rela-
tionships you can think of, add legal recognition, and, as my five-
year-old daughter likes to say, “hocus-pocus-ala-kazamm-VOILÀ!” 
But, without taking anything away from what mentoring relation-
ships can do for children, what children really need are homes—that 
is, one or preferably two natural or adoptive parents, plus a ceiling 
and four walls, and some hope of stability and duration. 
De facto parenthood, and the “parent inflation” that it repre-
sents, contradicts the need to preserve the parental relationship as a 
special and uniquely valuable one. Instead, it contributes to the indi-
vidual life projects of the adults who wish to achieve de facto paren-
tal status. It is, so to speak, “about” the grown-ups, and not “about” 
the children. 
In conclusion, good family law is not infinitely plastic. Certain 
realities exist that our laws can reflect or fight with, but not ignore. 
As social critic Maggie Gallagher has argued: 
We did not, in the first place, create the erotic drama that marriage 
embodies. We do not make Eros, it makes us, and the world. . . . 
Children are the great sign of Eros, who make nonsense of contract 
because they make nonsense of everything, because they make no 
sense at all. If greed or reason ruled the world instead of Eros, 
there would be no children.47 
Of course, much of present-day theorizing about family and sex-
ual relationships assumes that we did, in fact, create the erotic drama 
of childbearing to which Gallagher refers.48 If we created it, we can 
manipulate it. This is not the occasion to go to the fundamentals of 
 
 46. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1. 
 47. MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS 209–10 (1989). 
 48. See, e.g., TAMSIN SPARGO, FOUCAULT AND QUEER THEORY 11–13 (1999). 
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this argument.49 I would maintain, though, that if the twenty-first 
century witnesses tinkering with the fundamentals of human rela-
tionships the way the twentieth witnessed tinkering with the funda-
mentals of economic relationships, it will be another century of state-
sponsored chaos and disaster. 
Just as, in Gallagher’s argument, marriage is too great and myste-
rious to be contained by contract law, so parenthood is too great and 
mysterious to be within the gift of legislators or law reformers, how-
ever well-intentioned. Revelation to one side, only the composite 
common sense of the generations—sometimes called tradition—can 
come up with a system of parental law. A priori system-makers will 
be ineffective at best, and destructive at worst. 
American law should adhere to the known and existing means of 
creating the parental relationship. Parents do, of course, need help in 
rearing their children—help from family, friends, voluntary associa-
tions, and, in extreme cases, government agencies—and the more 
straitened the circumstances of a particular parent, the more such 
help that parent will need. But the sources of that help should be 
honored under their familiar names, as for instance when Alasdair 
MacIntyre writes: 
Neither the state nor the family then is the form of association 
whose common good is to be both served and sustained by the vir-
tues of acknowledged dependence. It must instead be some form of 
local community with which the activities of families, workplaces, 
schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs dedicated to 
games and sports, and religious congregations may all find a 
place.50 
Uncles, aunts, bosses, colleagues, teachers, doctors, nurses, de-
bating partners, coaches, teammates, clergymen, and others that did 
not make MacIntyre’s list, always have and always will help parents, 
sometimes to a heroic degree. But opening up an easy way for them 
to attain the name and legal status of “parent” over their nieces, 
nephews, students, patients, team members, congregants, etc., will 
only devalue that name and that legal status, while doing nothing for 
the children that is not already being done. 
 
 49. But see supra notes 32 and 37. 
 50. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS 
NEED THE VIRTUES 135 (1999). 
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